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Abstract
The security of the Bitcoin system is based on having a large amount of computa-
tional power in the hands of honest miners. Such miners are incentivized to join the
system and validate transactions by the payments issued by the protocol to anyone
who creates blocks. As new bitcoins creation rate decreases (halving approximately
every 4 years), the revenue derived from transaction fees start to have an increasingly
important role. We argue that Bitcoin’s current fee market does not extract revenue
well when blocks are not congested. This effect has implications for the scalability
debate: revenue from transaction fees may decrease if block size is increased.
The current mechanism is a “pay your bid” auction in which included transactions
pay the amount they suggested. We propose two alternative auction mechanisms: The
Monopolistic Price Mechanism, and the Random Sampling Optimal Price (RSOP)
Mechanism (due to Goldberget al.). In the monopolistic price mechanism, the miner
chooses the number of accepted transactions in the block, and all transactions pay
exactly the smallest bid included in the block. The mechanism thus sets the block
size dynamically (up to a bound required for fast block propagation and other security
concerns). We show, using analysis and simulations, that this mechanism extracts
revenue better from users, and that it is nearly incentive compatible: the profit due to
strategic bidding relative to honest biding decreases as the number of bidders grows.
Users can then simply set their bids truthfully to exactly the amount they are willing
to pay to transact, and do not need to utilize fee estimate mechanisms, do not resort to
bid shading and do not need to adjust transaction fees (via replace-by-fee mechanisms)
if the mempool grows.
We discuss these and other properties of our mechanisms, and explore various de-
sired properties of fee market mechanisms for crypto-currencies.
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1 Introduction
The Bitcoin system is known to be more secure against double spending attacks as more
computational power is invested by honest miners [Nak08]. Miners are nodes in Bitcoin’s
network that solve proof-of-work puzzles that are required by the protocol. To improve the
network’s security it is important to attract miners and to incentivize them to invest large
amounts of computational power. Nakamoto’s approach was to pay miners to partake in
the security of the system: a miner that solves a proof-of-work puzzle successfully is allowed
to create a block within Bitcoin’s blockchain. The block, which is a collection of approved
transactions, awards the lucky miner with a block reward of newly minted bitcoins plus the
sum of all the fees included in the transactions within that block.
Two main problems in today’s Bitcoin system are (i) obtaining sufficient revenue for the
miners as the block reward gradually decreases, and (ii) throughput limitation as a result
of the maximal block size. More specifically, the block reward which started as B50 per
block is cut in half approximately every 4 years.1 Therefore, in the long run, transaction fees
will become the dominating source of miners’ income and thus the main determinant of the
security of the system. To circumvent double spending attacks, and maintain the security of
the system, it is crucial that this source of income will be significant. In fact, the security of
bitcoin is in some sense a public good, enjoyed by all who transact with the currency, and
collectively paid for by its users. Bitcoin’s fee mechanism is a way to combat the tragedy of
the commons : each individual user wishes to pay low fees, while still enjoying the security
that is purchased with the fees of others. If each acted ”selfishly” and did not pay, security
would decline. Competition in the fee market is what keeps the rational behavior of Bitcoin’s
users (partially) aligned with the goal of buying enough security for the entire system.
The second problem, of the limited throughput, is in fact related to the first. Indeed,
one of the main arguments against a block-size increase in Bitcoin had been that the fees for
transactions may drop to the point where not enough security is purchased for the system.
In this paper we essentially show how a different fee market mechanism can extract revenue
which does not decrease as block size increases. Hence, decoupling the effect block size
increases would have on the fee market from other considerations (like block propagation
times, or the fairness of the reward distribution under larger blocks) and providing scalability
from the economic perspective of the fee market.
Our contributions: In this paper we reconsider the design of Bitcoin’s fee market. We
propose a conceptual framework which uses auction theory to determine which transactions
will be included in each block. Our main contribution is the proposal and analysis of two
auction-based mechanisms for the fee market: the monopolistic price mechanism, and the
RSOP mechanism which is based on the Random Sampling Optimal Price (RSOP) auction
defined by Goldberg et al. [GHK+06]. These two mechanisms essentially decouple the revenue
from fees from the block-size which can be freely determined according to other security
1The symbol B represents 1 bitcoin. We use B or bitcoin to represent the currency, and Bitcoin to
represent the Bitcoin network or the protocol.
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considerations.
We analyze the properties of these two mechanisms using a combination of analytical tools
and simulations. In particular, we show several key properties, primarily (i) a high revenue
extraction from the users of the system (which will imply a high level of security for the
protocol), (ii) incentivizing the miner in its role as an auctioneer to follow the protocol, and
(iii) simplicity for transaction issuers: Both mechanisms encourage participants to simply
reveal their true preferences – in this case to plainly state how much they are willing to
pay in transaction fees. While in Bitcoin wallets today, fee estimation mechanisms cause
the wallet to use different transaction fees as a response to the current congestion level, our
design implies that the wallet software can run independently of the behavior of others and
of external conditions.
Along the way we clearly define the desiderata for such mechanisms including resilience
to the various ways participants may deviate and manipulate the protocol. Also, we examine
the benefits and faults of the mechanism currently used by Bitcoin.
The blockchain as a single monopolist While the miners in the Nakamoto consensus
are separate entities, the protocol itself allows them to act in concert and to reach consensus.
We therefore consider the collective of miners as a single monopolist that can coherently
charge non-competitive prices from the users. This can be implemented if miners enforce
such pricing schemes as part of the consensus mechanism and consider blocks that deviated
from these mechanisms as invalid. In this sense, we conceptually consider the monopolist
as a single entity acting on behalf of the entire system (in practice, individual miners still
obtain the rewards, and we must ensure that individual miners do not deviate).
The Monopolistic Price Mechanism. Our first mechanism operates according to the
following rules:
• Each transaction specifies a bid which is the maximal fee it is willing to pay.2
• Miners can choose which subset of transactions they include in their block.
• All transactions in the block pay the exact same fee, which is given by the lowest bid
contained in the block.
• Miners are expected to choose transactions in a way that will maximize the revenue
obtained, i.e., maximize the number of included transactions times the minimal bid –
see Eq. (2.1).
As the mechanism above provides miners the maximal revenue (by allowing them to select
the set of included transactions and effectively set the monopolistic price), myopic miners
gain nothing from a range of manipulations of the protocol, mainly, adding fake transactions,
2This deviates from the current way Bitcoin transactions are structured, and requires some architectural
modifications.
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or excluding legitimate ones. The main issue we address is therefore the manipulations of the
users. We focus on impatient users, defined as those who desire that their transaction will be
included in the next block, and have no utility from inclusion in later blocks. This effectively
makes it a single shot game, rather than a repeated game which is often much harder to
analyze. For these users we show that honest (truthful) behavior is nearly an equilibrium:
our analysis shows, both analytically (for more details on the assumptions and the results,
see Thm. 2.3) and empirically (see Section 4), that relative gains from strategic bidding go
to 0 as the number of transactions increases. We further show that the monopolistic price
protocol collects at least as much revenue from impatient users (and hence buys at least as
much security) as Bitcoin’s current mechanism.
The RSOP Mechanism We consider the following mechanism.
• Partition the transactions in each block to two sets using a random assignment.
• Compute the monopolistic price (see Eq. (2.2)) for each set.
• Apply the price computed for each set to the complementary set (i.e., only transactions
that bid higher than the monopolistic price in the complementary set are accepted,
and all pay that same price).
This auction still focuses on obtaining some price that is close to the monopolist’s price.
The main difference is that it removes (by design) the ability of an individual transaction
to affect the price that it pays, as the price is always determined by transactions in the
complementary set. Therefore, it is not beneficial to shade the true maximal willingness to
pay, as such bid modifications cannot affect the price for that user (although we must still
consider splitting transactions, since a single Bitcoin user may have several pseudo-entities).
Instead, miners may again benefit from inserting some additional transactions, or ignoring
valid transactions, to manipulate their revenue. We conjecture that such manipulations are
not severe3.
A major practical limitation of the RSOP mechanism is that it usually includes many
transactions in the blocks that are not eventually considered valid into the ledger. While
clever use of cryptographic techniques may alleviate this concern, we currently leave a com-
prehensive solution as an open problem. For this reason, we believe that the monopolistic
price mechanism will be more practical, at least as a first attempt. We discuss other advan-
tages and disadvantages of this mechanism at greater length later in the paper.
1.1 Bitcoin’s current fee mechanism
The current design of Bitcoin’s fee mechanism requires users to set a fee that they are
willing to pay for each transaction. This fee is encoded in the transaction message itself.
Once a transaction is included in a block, the fee is awarded automatically to the miner that
3More precisely, we conjecture that the ratio between the revenue of an honest miner and a strategic
miner goes to 1 as the number of players goes to infinity. This is partly supported by Theorem 5.2.
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successfully created that block. Transactions are thus effectively given as take-it-or-leave-it
offers to miners. We thus name the current fee mechanism that is used in Bitcoin Pay-your-
Bid. Since the size of each block is capped, each miner’s transaction inclusion strategy is
straightforward: they gain most if they first include transactions that pay higher fees (fees
are actually sorted by the payment per KB that the transaction takes up as transactions
sizes may vary as well). As demand for transferring bitcoins increases, transaction fees are
expected to increase as users compete for limited space in blocks. For simplicity, we assume
from now on that all transactions are of fixed size, and are thus sorted by the amount they
pay. Adapting the mechanisms we propose to varying transaction sizes is trivial (substituting
cost per Byte instead of cost per transaction).
Critique of the current mechanism There are several significant disadvantages to the
current fee market design. The main one is that the revenue extraction is often deficient. In
the following we describe the two main downsides of the current design.
• Bid shading, and frequent bid updates. Unlike in the first-price sealed bid auction,
where users pay the amount they bid but do not see the bids of other before hand,
Bitcoin users can see the transactions that are queued for inclusion, and may use this
information to set their own fee. In particular, a user who is willing to pay a high
fee sees that a lower amount will still guarantee that her transaction will get included,
will shade her bid, and offer a smaller fee that is currently sufficient. Thus, the fees
observed on the network are in fact not truthful representation of the actual amounts
users are willing to bid, but rather provide a lower bound which may in fact be far
from the truth. This in itself is not problematic, however, as more transactions arrive
and are queued for inclusion in the next block, the threshold price of transactions that
enter the block grows. Users may then wish to re-transmit their transactions and offer a
higher fee4. This requires that they remain online and continually monitor the memory
pool (the buffer used to hold bitcoin transactions), or settle for either higher fees than
are absolutely necessary to get into the block (or alternatively lower the certainty that
they would enter a block)
• Poor revenue extraction. Consider for example a situation in which blocks could contain
2000 transactions, but only 1000 users are interested in sending money. As each user
sees that the next block is not expected to be full, they can offer an arbitrarily small
fee. Regardless of how low the fee is, the miner’s incentive is to accept this transaction,
as no alternative one can take its place.5 Overall, all users will bid low, and provide
negligible revenue for the miner. If this state persists, miners who receive little reward,
but still exert effort to create blocks, will withdraw from mining, which in turn will
lower security guarantees.
4Older versions of the Bitcoin client did not allow fee readjustments, but current miners adapted a
”replace-by-fee” policy that transactions can opt-in for, as the rational step to increase their profit. See
http://www.webcitation.org/6qnP9ROYL.
5Here we neglect communication effects due to larger block size [Riz15].
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In general, if a block can contain ` transactions, the fee paid by each transaction will
be determined by the `+1th highest bidder, as shading will occur. It may happen that
a smaller block size would yield more revenue for the miner.
To emphasize the problem with the current market, consider the following thought exper-
iment: If some technological advancement allows for larger blocks to be used in the protocol
with no additional security risk, then the fees collected by much larger blocks can decrease
to 0 if there is no demand for all of the newly available space. This is because the Bitcoin
block size serves as the effective price-setting rule for the transaction given a particular dis-
tribution of users. Thus, in general, the block size that is used for security purposes due to
block propagation [DW13, SZ15] is not necessarily the one that would yield a high-enough
revenue. We therefore advocate for a separation of the block size mechanism for security
purposes (which we take as an upper bound on the blocks that are produced in practice)
from any economic mechanism that selects transactions for inclusion and may decide not to
allocate all available space within that limit for transactions.
We demonstrate this point in Figure 1, where we compare the revenue of the current
pay-your-bid strategy to the one obtained by the monopolistic price mechanism. For the
former, we assume that bids are shaded by the participants so that they all match the one
needed to enter the block, i.e., these are equilibrium bids that are equivalent to the `+ 1’th
valuation (assuming ` is the number of transactions can enter a block). The revenue for the
monopolistic price assumes honest bids. We demonstrate the revenue assuming utilities that
were sampled randomly from the interval [0, 1]. As can be seen from the graph, the revenue
of both mechanisms is (roughly) the same, as long as the block size is small. At some point,
the monopolistic price mechanism no longer uses the extra block size, and maintains its high
revenue whereas the pay-your-bid mechanism accepts more transactions and suffers from
prices that fall dramatically.
In spite of our critique of the current mechanism, it is important to note its obvious
benefits: It is relatively simple, the fee a transaction will pay is known in advance, and there
are no manipulations that could be made by the miners (e.g., if they add fake transactions
to blocks they have little to gain).
1.2 Desiderata
Next we provide the desired properties of a fee mechanism in Bitcoin. We note that some of
the properties mentioned below may conflict with others, and it may well be that no single
mechanism provides them simultaneously.
High social welfare The sum of valuations of accepted transactions should be large. In
this sense, the system is providing a high level of utility to its users. In particular, an efficient
allocation is warranted: transactions with higher fees should be included before those with
lower fees (assuming both are available at the same time) as this clearly improves the social
welfare.
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Figure 1: The revenue of the pay-your-bid and monopolistic price mechanisms for various
block sizes. Utilities were sampled i.i.d. from the [0, 1] interval. The x-axis denotes the
number of transactions that can fit into a block.
Revenue extraction The amount of money transfered to the miners is high, which would
buy more security for the system. Stated another way: the revenue of miners should be part
of the social welfare measure of the system.
Direct revelation by the users and truthful bidding An ideal mechanism would allow
users to state their preferences clearly and would encourage honest reporting. The main
advantage would be that users do not need to ”overthink” how they should act. Simply
state their true preferences. Furthermore, there is no need to monitor the network for price,
perform estimates of the threshold fee needed to get accepted into a block, and no need to
perform fee updates for the transaction.
Additionally, no manipulation by users should be profitable: splitting a single transac-
tion into two transfers of smaller amounts, adding more transactions between two bitcoin
addresses of the same client, etc.
Resistance to manipulation by miners The mechanism should be resistant to selfish
behavior by the miners. Such behavior can include miners adding transactions of their own
into their own blocks, miners withholding transactions and selecting other sets of transac-
tions, etc.
Resistance to manipulation via side payments Some mechanisms may seem to pro-
vide good fees, but in fact may encourage miners and users to circumvent the fee system
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altogether. For example, if a miner has to give half of the revenue from his block to the
miner that creates the next block in the chain, then he can offer users a deal: The miner
will include transactions with 0 fees in his block in exchange for a side payment that will
be given to him via a separate and direct transaction. In this manner, he does not need to
share the rewards with others.
Adaptivity to changing demand, network conditions, block sizes, etc. It is impor-
tant to avoid hard-coded magic numbers (such as hard-coded minimal fees) in the protocol
as much as possible. Given that the protocol is hard to update, as it requires wide adoption
of new code, any hard-coded number is difficult to adjust. A minimal fee, for example, which
may need adjusting from time to time (e.g., when the exchange rate fluctuates, or demand
increases) would insert inefficiency when it is not set in accordance with market conditions.
Accounting for temporal considerations Users may have different levels of urgency for
their transactions. A good fee mechanism will take into account the willingness of users to
delay the acceptance of their transactions, e.g., in exchange for paying lower fees. In Bitcoin,
transactions that were not added to the blockchain persist with the same fee and may be
included in other blocks (without a discount). Our own analysis in this paper considers only
impatient users who only desire that their transactions will be included in the next block.
We believe that such temporal considerations are an important issue to tackle in future work.
1.3 Related Work
There are relatively few works that analyze the Bitcoin fee market, and fewer still that offer
modifications to the basic mechanism.
Kroll et al. [KDF13] provided an early analysis of the economics of Bitcoin mining, in-
cluding some game theoretic analysis of the incentives to mine on the longest chain. Babaioff
et al. [BDOZ12] consider the incentives of miners to distribute transactions to each other
and design ways to share the fees in exchange for distribution. Carlsten et al. [CKWN16]
explore the security of Bitcoin and the incentive to mine blocks properly when block rewards
diminish and fees dominate the revenue of miners. They show that variance in fees may
undermine the security of the protocol and subject it to different forms of deviations and
attacks. Bonneau [Bon16] explores related bribery attacks on the protocol that are paid
for through promises of higher rewards for attackers that construct blocks off the longest
chain. A work by Rizun [Riz15] considers the removal of the block limit altogether, arguing
that delays in the propagation time of large blocks, which in turn imply a higher likelihood
that the block is abandoned (often referred to as an orphaned block), will result in miners
restricting their own block size. The paper analyzes the fee market that results. Huberman
et al. [HLM17] model the transaction fee market assuming that users benefit less if their
transactions are delayed. They show that this, together with congestion that may naturally
occur in blocks due to queuing effects can lead to non-zero bids for transacting users even if
blocks are not completely full.
8
As far as we are aware, no previous work has explored a different mechanism for the fee
market in crypto-currencies.
An important approach to resolve Bitcoin’s scalability problem is off-chain transactions,
such as the Lightning network [PD15]. The idea is that the vast majority of the transac-
tions are to be made off-line, in so-called payment channels, without including them in a
block. In this setting, settlements are needed only in rare cases (for example, opening and
closing channels). It is unclear how this change would affect Bitcoin’s fee market, and more
specifically, the miners’ revenue.
2 The Monopolistic Price Mechanism
In this section we describe our first mechanism for the fee market, the monopolistic price
mechanism and define our model.
We consider n users, each with her own transaction to include in the block, and a miner
that is now constructing the block. We assume that every user i has a maximum fee, vi,
that she is willing to pay for her transaction to be included in the block. Our approach is as
follows: every transaction includes a bid (maximum fee) and all transactions that are chosen
to be included in the block pay the minimal bid included in the block. Formally, suppose
the bids in the block are b1 ≥ b2 ≥ ... ≥ bk, then everyone pays bk. Given the bids of all
users b = (b1, . . . , bn) where b1 ≥ . . . ≥ bn, define the monopolistic revenue as:
R(b) = maxk∈[n]k · bk (2.1)
(where [n] ≡ {1, ..., n}). Given the vector of bids b, if a miner will be restricted by the
Bitcoin protocol to charge the same payment from all transactions in the block, the optimal
revenue that the miner can achieve is R(b).6 Denote by k∗(b) the number of users that
maximize the monopolistic revenue R(b) (in case of ties, k∗ is taken to be the maximal one).
The monopolistic price is
pmonopolistic(b) = bk∗(b). (2.2)
A user, however, might wish to submit a bid that is lower than her true maximum fee,
i.e. bi < vi (this is sometimes termed “bid shading”). To see why bid shading is profitable
for the user, consider the following examples:
Example 2.1. Suppose all users 1, . . . , n, have the same maximum fee vi = 1. If all users
bid bi = vi then R(b) = n, k
∗(b) = n, and pmonopolistic(b) = 1. I.e., all users get accepted to
the block and they all pay 1. However, in such a case, a strategic user, say user 1, can reduce
her payment a bit by reducing her bid to be b1 =
n−1
n
. With such a bid, notice that the
monopolistic price decreases to n−1
n
: if all bids of value 1 are accepted the miner’s revenue is
n− 1 and if all bids of value at least b1 = n−1n are accepted the miner’s revenue is still n− 1.
Thus, being strategic helped user 1 to reduce her payment.
6This assumes that the miner is myopic, i.e., she does not expect to create another block in the near
future.
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This example suggests that a user can indeed benefit from bid shading but the possible
gain from it vanishes as the number of users (and the block size) increases. We will establish
later that this observation in fact holds in many realistic settings under reasonable distribu-
tional assumptions. However, in the worst case, there could be cases where the manipulations
yield significant gains, as the following example shows:
Example 2.2. Suppose users v1 = 2, . . . , vn
2
+1 = 2, vn
2
+2 = 1, . . . , vn = 1. If user 1 is
strategic, she can significantly reduce her payment by submitting a smaller bid n−1
n
≈ 1
instead of 2.
The point that we make here is that, although in the worst case users can manipulate,
“usually” (under various reasonable distributional assumptions), this will not happen as the
possible gain from such a manipulation becomes very close to zero when there are many users
in each block. We first show a theoretical result and then describe an extensive empirical
analysis to validate this claim.
To continue with the formal discussion, we first define a few notions. Fix a user i and
a vector of bids b−i ≡ (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn) of the other users. Let phonest(vi, b−i) ≡
pmonopolistic(vi, b−i) and
pstrategic(b−i) ≡ min{bi ∈ R | pmonopolistic(bi, b−i) ≤ bi}.78 (2.3)
As an illustration, Figure 2 presents pmonopolistic(b1, 1), and Figure 3 presents the strategic
prices in an example with n = 256 users. As can be seen from this example, pstrategic is
monotonically decreasing among the winning users (higher winning bids imply lower strategic
prices) but not among all users (this property will be proved later in Claim A.8). It is also
interesting to note that, in this example (as well as in other simulations), almost all winning
users have the same strategic prices, the exception being the very few winning users with the
lowest bids (i.e., prices slightly higher than the monopolistic price), whose strategic prices
are higher (i.e., they can gain less from being strategic). A similar situation holds for the
losing users. Most of them have the same strategic price, except for the few highest ones.
We next define the “discount ratio” from strategic bid shading. In words, this is 0 if the
the user does not get into the block, even if she is honest. Otherwise, it is one minus the
ratio between the monopolistic price when the user is strategic,and the monopolistic price
when the user is honest. Formally,
δi(vi, b−i) =
1− p
strategic(b−i)
phonest(vi,b−i)
if vi ≥ pstrategic(b−i)
0 otherwise.
(2.4)
7Here the strategic user chooses the lowest possible bid that would get her included in the block. This is
indeed the optimal strategy, assuming that the user can only provide one bid. See an additional discussion
in the sequel regarding the case that the user can split her bid.
8The minimum is well defined by Claim B.1, using f(bi) = p
monopolistic(bi, b−i). Claim A.13, shows that
f(bi) satisfies the property required by Claim B.1, and clearly there exists bi such that bi ≥ f(bi), e.g., taking
any bi > maxj 6=i bj .
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Figure 2: The function pmonopolistic(b1, 1) as a function of b1. This demonstrates that
pmonopolistic is not monotone and not continuous. As can be seen, the strategic price of
the first bidder is 0.5.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Valuation for each player (vi)
0.42
0.43
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
ps
tr
at
eg
ic
(v
!
i)
Winning players
Loosing players
y(x)=x line
Figure 3: An example with n = 256 bids sampled i.i.d from the uniform distribution on [0, 1].
For each user, the x-axis shows her values and the y-axis shows her strategic price. Winning
bids, which are marked with ’x’, must be at least as high as their respective strategic price,
i.e., to the right of the black line.
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Note that 0 ≤ δi(vi, b−i) ≤ 1. The discount ratio captures the gain that a user can obtain
from strategic bidding: if vi < p
strategic(b−i), there is no way for user i to win with a bid
of at most vi, and therefore her gain is 0. If vi ≥ pstrategic(b−i), user i can win and pay
pstrategic(b−i), but with an honest bid she will pay phonest(vi, b−i). She can thus save a
percentage of 1− pstrategic(b−i)
phonest(vi,b−i)
from her payment by strategically adjusting her bid.
Our goal is to quantify how large the discount factor will typically be. The claims will be
distributional, and not worst case. In this section we assume that all true values are drawn
i.i.d from some distribution F on R>0. We will bound the average discount ratio which, as
a first attempt, can be defined as:
∆averagen = E(v1,...,vn)∼F [δ1(v1,v−1)]
(The choice of user 1 is arbitrary since all users are symmetric a-priori.)
We will in fact consider two stronger definitions to measure the maximal and worst-
case discount ratios. In the first extension, for each realization of the values, we consider
the maximum discount ratio among all players. This is obviously always larger than the
previous definition, and thus claiming that this goes to zero as n increases is stronger.
δmax(v) = max
i
δi(vi,v−i)
∆maxn = E(v1,...,vn)∼F [δmax(v)]
Clearly, it holds for every n that ∆maxn ≥ ∆averagen since for every v and every i, δmax(v) ≥
δi(vi,v−i).
Theorem 2.3. For any distribution F with a finite support size, limn→∞∆maxn = 0.
In the second extension, defined only for distributions with a finite bounded support, we
fix player 1, and assume that she deterministically has a value that maximizes her discount
ratio (the worst possible value for her, from our perspective), while all other values are
probabilistic. This captures a situation where a user knows her own value but only knows
a distribution over the other values. As we show below, even in this case the discount ratio
goes to zero as the number of users increases.
δworst−casen (b−1) = max
v1∈Support(F )
δ1(v1, b−1)
∆worst−casen = E(v2,...,vn)∼F [δworst−casen (v−1)]
The relation between ∆worst−casen and ∆
max
n depends on the distribution, as the following
example shows:
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Example 2.4. Consider the distribution Pr(vi = 1) = p and Pr(vi = ) = 1 − p where
0 <  < 1. In this case, if p < 0.5 then ∆worst−casen=2 > ∆
max
n=2 and if p > 0.5 then ∆
worst−case
n=2 <
∆maxn=2 , as the following calculation shows.
∆worst−casen=2 =Ev2∼F [ max
v1∈{,1}
δ1(1, v2)] = Ev2∼F [δ1(1, v2)]
= pδ(1, 1) + (1− p)δ(1, )
=p · 1
2
+ (1− p) · (1− 
2
)
∆maxn=2 =E(v1,v2)∼F [max
i
δi(v1, v2)] = p
2δi(1, 1) + (1− p)2δ1(, ) + 2p(1− p) max
i
δi(1, )
=p2δi(1, 1) + (1− p)2δ1(, ) + 2p(1− p)δ1(1, )
=(1− 2p(1− p)) · 1
2
+ 2p(1− p) · (1− 
2
)
Similarly to Theorem 2.3, it is also the case that ∆worst−casen goes to zero as n goes to
infinity, when user values are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution F with a finite support size.
The proof is very similar to the proof in Section 2.1, and is omitted here.9 Because both
quantities go to zero as n increases, clearly the difference between them also goes to zero
as n increases. In the empirical analysis that will be presented in the next section we will
focus on ∆maxn , mainly because it is more convenient to work with when the distribution has
unbounded support.
As a last note, we remark that we believe that these theoretical conclusions could be
further extended, as follows.
Conjecture 2.5.
1. For any distribution F , limn→∞∆averagen = 0. Specifically, ∆
average
n = O
(
1
n
)
.10
2. If F has a bounded support (which may still give probability on an infinite set of
values) limn→∞∆maxn = 0. Specifically, ∆
max
n = O
(
1
n
)
.
3. There exists a distribution F with an unbounded support such that limn→∞∆maxn > 0.
2.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3
The get intuition for the proof, consider the following example. The distribution F assigns
the probability p to the value 1 and the probability 1 − p to the value 2. If p > 1
2
, and as
n increases, the probability that the monopolistic price is 1 with probability very close to 1,
and the strategic price in this case is 1 − 1
n
. Therefore, δmaxn =
1
n
which, indeed, decreases
9The main change is that we need to set the value of the first user to the maximal value in the support
of F , and all statements hold with respect to the first player, instead of player i∗ as defined in Section 2.1.
10The coefficient in the O(·) notation may depend on F .
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to 0. If p > 1
2
, the monopolistic price is 2 with high probability, and the strategic price is
slightly below 2 (to be more precise, it is 2− 1
k∗ ): the value 1 yields a revenue of n, wheres
a value of 2 yields a higher value, of about 2(1− p). The case where p = 1
2
is slightly more
complicated. In some cases, there would be more players with value 1, and then the strategic
price would be 1− 1
n
, and in some cases there would be more players bidding 2, and in this
case the strategic price would be roughly 2. But, in some rare cases there would be ties (or
a tie up to one player). For example, there could be 5 players with value 1 and 6 players
with value 2. In this case, the monopolistic price is 2, but the strategic price for a 2 player
is 1 − 1
11
, and therefore δmaxn ≈ 12 . The probability of having these close ties is the same as
the probability that a random walk returns to 0 after exactly n steps, which is O( 1√
n
), and
therefore diminishes as n grows. When F has a finite support, the argument is similar and
uses a union bound over all possible pairs of values (which is also finite).
Proof For a given tuple v of n values, let i∗ = argmaxi=1,...,nvi and let k
∗ = k∗(v−i∗)
be the optimal block size for v−i∗ . In addition let phonest = phonest(v) and pstrategic =
pstrategic(v−i∗). We first show two lemmas:
Lemma 2.6. For any F with finite support size, there exists a constant c > 0 (which may
depend on F but not on n) such that
lim
n→∞
Pr[k∗ < c · n] = 0.
This lemma shows that when F has finite support, and when the user which is willing to
pay the most is removed, the number of winners grows linearly with n,.
Proof Let vmax = max Support(F ), kmax be the number of bidders in v who bid vmax,
and pmax = Prvi∼F [vi = vmax]. By linearity of expectation, E[kmax] = pmax · n. Using the
Chernoff bound, it follows that
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
kmax <
9npmax
10
)
= 0.
Clearly, the bidders who bid vmax win, and therefore k
∗ + 1 ≥ kmax. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
k∗ + 1 <
9npmax
10
)
= 0.
Choosing c = 8pmax
10
completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 2.7. limn→∞ Pr(pstrategic < k
∗
k∗+1p
honest) = 0.
Proof Define A as the event where pstrategic < k
∗
k∗+1p
honest. The proof will define an
event B and show two facts: (i) limn→∞ Pr(B) = 0, and (ii) A ⊆ B. This implies that
limn→∞ Pr(A) = 0 as claimed.
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To define event B, fix any arbitrary x > y in the support of F . Define num(v, z) ≡
|{vi|vi ≥ z}|. Let the random variables nz = num(v, z) for any real number z. Let h(x) =
nx · x and g(x) = (nx − 1) · x. This is the same as nx > yxny ≥ nx − 1 which implies nx =b y
x
ny+1c. The triple (nx, ny−nx, n−ny) is a multinomial (specifically, trinomial) distribution
with probabilities p1 = Prvi∼F (vi ≥ x), p2 = Prvi∼F (x > vi ≥ y), p3 = Prvi∼F (vi < y) (note
that the pi’s depend on F but do not depend on n). Claim B.3 in Appendix B therefore
implies, taking f(ny) = b yxny + 1c,
lim
n→∞
Pr(h(x) > h(y) ≥ g(x)) = 0. (2.5)
Let B be the event in which ∃x > y ∈ Support(F ) s.t. h(x) > h(y) ≥ g(x). Since the
support is of finite size, there is a fixed number of such pairs x > y ∈ Support(F ). By
Eq. (2.5) and the union bound we conclude that limn→∞ Pr(B) = 0.
We show next that A ⊆ B, i.e., that pstrategic < k∗
k∗+1p
honest implies that ∃x > y ∈
Support(F ) s.t. h(x) > h(y) ≥ g(x). Let x = phonest and let y be the smallest element in the
support of F which is at least pstrategic. By Claim A.6, the event pstrategic < k
∗
k∗+1p
honest implies
that x > y. Since pmonopolistic(vi∗ ,v−i∗) = x it follows that h(x) = nx · x > ny · y = h(y).
Furthermore,
h(y) ≥ h(pstrategic)
= npstrategic · pstrategic
= num(v, pstrategic) · pstrategic
= num((pstrategic,v−i∗), pstrategic) · pstrategic
≥ num((pstrategic,v−i∗), x) · x
= (nx − 1) · x = g(x)
where the first step follows since ny = npstrategic and p
strategic ≤ y, the fourth step fol-
lows since vi∗ ≥ x > y ≥ pstrategic, the fifth step follows from Claim A.5 that shows
that pmonopolistic(pstrategic,v−i∗) = pstrategic, and the sixth step follows since vi∗ ≥ x > y ≥
pstrategic.
These two lemmas imply the theorem, as follows. Define the “bad” event E1 to be the
case where k∗ < c · n (where c is the constant that is guaranteed to exist from Lemma 2.6)
and the “bad” event E2 as the case where p
strategic < k
∗
k∗+1p
honest.
By Claim A.9, δmax(v) = δi∗(v). Therefore, ∆
max
n = Ev[δi∗(v)].
If E2 does not hold, then p
strategic ≥ k∗
k∗+1p
honest and therefore δi∗(v) ≤ 1k∗+1 . Thus,
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lim
n→∞
∆maxn = lim
n→∞
[
Pr[E1 ∪ E2]Ev[δi∗(vi∗ , v−i∗)|E1 ∪ E2] + Pr[Ec1 ∩ Ec2]Ev
[
δi∗(vi∗ , v−1)|Ec1 ∩ Ec2
]]
≤ lim
n→∞
[
Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] + Pr[E
c
1 ∩ Ec2] · Ev[
1
k∗ + 1
|Ec1 ∩ Ec2]
]
≤ lim
n→∞
[
Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] + Pr[E
c
1 ∩ Ec2] ·
1
c · n
]
≤ lim
n→∞
[
Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] +
1
c · n
]
= 0
2.2 Multiple strategic bids
The following example demonstrates that there are cases where it is beneficial to split one’s
bid to several separate transactions with several separate bids. In fact, such a strategy
sometimes enables a losing transaction to be included in the block.
Example 2.8. Suppose v = (5, 2, 1, 1). If all users submit truthful bids, the monopolistic
price will be 5 and the second user will not be included. However, if the second user submits
two separate transactions, both of them with a bid of 1, then the monopolistic price will be
1 and all bids will be included.
The empirical evaluation accounts for such situations and shows that the benefit from
using multiple bids also goes to zero as n increases, in a similar way to the case where multiple
bids are not considered. In this section we generalize the definition of pstrategic to capture
the possible benefit from splitting the bid. This is captured by the following definition:
pmultibid(b−i) = min{u·b(u)i | u ∈ N+, b(1)i ≥ . . . ≥ b(u)i ∈ R, b(u)i ≥ pmonopolistic(b(1)i , . . . , b(u)i , b−i)}
In this definition, user i splits her bid to u different bids such that all of them are accepted,
and because of that she pays at most u · b(u)i . Clearly pstrategic(b−i) ≥ pmultibid(b−i) because
the case of u = 1 results in pstrategic. Example 2.8 shows that there are cases in which the
inequality is strict. The following definition is a more natural version of the previous one,
and it is straightforward to show the equivalence of the two:
pmultibid(b−i) = min{u · bi | u ∈ N+, bi ∈ R, bi ≥ pmonopolistic(
u times︷ ︸︸ ︷
bi, . . . , bi, b−i)}.11 (2.6)
11The minimum is well defined using an argument similar to that used for pstrategic. In particular, for
any positive integer u, use fu(bi) = p
monopolistic(bi, ..., bi, b−i) (where bi appears u times). By Claim A.10,
u ∈ {1, ..., n}. Since for every u, the infimum is contained in the set, then so is the infimum over the union
over u ∈ {1, ..., n}.
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We believe that Theorem 2.3 and Conjecture 2.5 hold in the case of multiple bids, where
in the definition of δ, pmultibid replaces pstrategic. In our empirical evaluation we use pmultibid
instead of pstrategic. In all the distributions we examined, except the discrete distribution,
we have never encountered a case in which the strategic player has an advantage placing
multiple bids. Even in the discrete case, the effect of such multiple bids was negligible.
3 An efficient algorithm for computing pmultibid
Equations (2.3) and (2.6) define the strategic and multi-bid strategic price of each player, but
give little information on how to algorithmically compute such a price (since the optimization
is done on an infinite set). In this section we provide an alternative form for Eq. (2.6) which
lends itself to a direct algorithmically efficient implementation. This will also be used in the
empirical analysis in Section 4.
For the computation of pmultibid, fix a player i, and let w = v−i. From now on we assume
w.l.o.g. that w is sorted, w1 ≥ w2, . . . ,≥ wn−1. Define
f(j) ≡ max

⌈
R(w)
wj
⌉
, j + 1
 .
Theorem 3.1. pmultibid(w) = mink∗(w)≤j≤n−1
R(w)
f(j)
(f(j)− j). Furthermore, if j∗ is the index
that minimizes this term, then taking b∗ = R(w)
f(j∗) and u
∗ = f(j∗)− j∗ minimizes the r.h.s. in
Eq. (2.6).
3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We begin with a useful Lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Let b, u be the arguments which minimize Eq. (2.6), j be the integer which
satisfies wj ≥ b > wj+1 and u∗ = f(j)− j. Then, u∗ ≥ 1 and u ≥ u∗.
Proof Since f(j) ≥ j + 1, u∗ ≥ 1. If f(j) = j + 1, u∗ = 1 and the claim immediately
follows. Thus assume that f(j) = dR(w)
wj
e. Suppose towards a contradiction that u ≤ u∗− 1.
Then,
R(
u times︷ ︸︸ ︷
b, . . . , b,w) = b · (u+ j) ≤ wj · (u∗ − 1 + j) = wj · (f(j)− 1) < R(w) (3.1)
where the first step follows since by Claim A.11
b = pmonopolistic(
u times︷ ︸︸ ︷
b, . . . , b,w)
and since there are exactly j bids in w that are at least b; and the last inequality follows
from f(j) < R(w)
wj
+ 1.
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However Eq. (3.1) shows a contradiction since adding bids can only increase the monop-
olistic revenue.
Proof We now prove the theorem. Let b, u be the arguments that determine pmultibid(w)
(i.e., (b, u) minimizes Eq. (2.6)). Let j be the integer that satisfies wj ≥ b > wj+1 (where
j = n− 1 if wn−1 ≥ b). By Claim A.12, j ≥ k∗(w). Let u∗ = f(j)− j and b∗ = R(w)f(j) . Then,
b · (u+ j) = R(
u times︷ ︸︸ ︷
b, . . . , b,w) ≥ R(w) = b∗ · (u∗ + j)
where the first step is the same as the first step in Eq. (3.1) above. Thus, b · u ≥ b∗ · u∗ + j ·
(b∗ − b). By Lemma 3.2, u ≥ u∗, which implies b · u ≥ b∗ · u∗ (since b · u < b∗ · u∗ and u ≥ u∗
implies b < b∗ and b · u < b∗ · u∗ + j · (b∗ − b), a contradiction). Thus,
pmultibid(w) = b · u ≥ b∗ · u∗ ≥ min
k∗(w)≤j≤n−1
R(w)
f(j)
(f(j)− j),
and the first part of the theorem follows. The second part follows in a straight-forward way
from the first part.
4 Empirical Evaluation
In this section we provide an empirical evaluation of the monopolistic price mechanism. The
overall goal is to show that the discount ratio of strategic players becomes negligible, in
accordance with the theoretical analysis and conjectures made in the previous sections. We
provide empirical evidence supporting the above conjectures, and give more details on the
rate at which the discount ratio converges to zero.
The empirical evaluation uses both synthetic data as well as transaction data taken from
the Bitcoin blockchain. The synthetic data is generated using four distributions:
1. A uniform discrete distribution over the integers 1, . . . , 100. This distribution has a
finite support size and therefore satisfies the requirements of Theorem 2.3.
2. The uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Notice that, here, the support size is infinite.
3. The half normal distribution. This represents the case where the probability for max-
imum fee x decreases exponentially with x. Thus, in this case, even though arbitrarily
high transaction fees will be seen, they are highly unlikely.
4. The inverse distribution F (x) = 1 − 1
x
for x ∈ [1,∞). This represents the case where
the probability for maximum fee x decreases polynomially with x.12
12The uniform distribution has no tail, the half normal distribution has a light tail because it decreases
exponentially fast, and the inverse distribution has a heavy tail. We will see that ∆maxn does not go to 0 as
n grows for the inverse distribution, as a result of its heavy tail. Indeed, it is the most difficult distribution
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In addition to the synthetic data, we also used real data from the Bitcoin blockchain.
The data was collected from 1000 consecutive blocks which constitute roughly one week of
activity ending in October 28th 2016. The data obviously does not contain the maximum
transaction fee (the maximum willingness to pay for the transaction) since this is not how
Bitcoin operates. In the simulations we estimate the user’s maximum willingness to pay,
v, as a function v = v(x) of the transaction size x.13 We use three alternative functions:
v(x) = log x, v(x) =
√
x, v(x) = x.14
We next present three sets of results to evaluate the actual discount ratios for these
distributions. Recall that the discount ratio of a player measures the possible gain, in per-
centages, that a user can achieve by submitting a strategic bid instead of her true maximum
willingness to pay, as explained in detail in Section 2). In Eq. (2.4), we use pmultibid instead
of pstrategic to take into account the most general manipulation possible. pmultibid is defined
and discussed in Section 2.2. The efficient algorithm used for computing it is described in
Section 3.
The following figures show ∆averagen and ∆
max
n as a function of the number of users, n.
Recall that ∆averagen is the average discount ratio over all players, and ∆
max
n is the maximal
discount ratio over all players. For each point n = 2i (i = 3, . . . , 17) we conducted 100
simulation runs. In each simulation we sampled n points from the bid distribution and
calculated the empirical discount ratios for each of the n users. Based on the empirical
ratios we calculated the empirical ∆averagen , which is the average over the n individual discount
ratios, and ∆maxn , which is the maximum over the n individual discount ratios. Each point
in the graph is the average over the 100 simulation runs.
The average discount ratio. Figure 4 shows ∆averagen as a function of the number of
users, n. As can be seen from the graph, ∆averagen behaves very similarly for all the tested
distributions. In particular, as stated in the first part of Conjecture 2.5, ∆averagen decreases
linearly with the number of users for all distributions, even those with an infinite and un-
bounded support size.
The maximal discount ratio. Figure 5 shows ∆maxn as a function n. As can be seen from
the graph, ∆maxn behaves differently for some of the tested distributions. For the uniform
distribution, ∆maxn decreases linearly with the number of users, supporting the second part
of Conjecture 2.5. The half normal distribution behaves similarly (even though it is not
bounded). For the inverse distribution, ∆maxn does not seem to decrease with the number
for the proposed mechanism, since for any price x ≥ 1, the revenue of the mechanism would be roughly
x · (1− F (x)) = x · 1− 1x = 1, thus (up to noise) all prices yield the same revenue, which makes it easy for
players to manipulate the prices by changing a single transaction. While we do not think that this distribution
represents the actual distribution of maximum transaction fees, we include it here to demonstrate that there
may indeed be bad cases for our mechanism.
13More specifically, x is the sum of all outputs of the Bitcoin transaction.
14Note that multiplying v(x) by a scalar does change the discount ratio. Therefore our results hold even
if v(x) is multiplied by some factor α > 0.
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Figure 4: The average discount ratio of a player from selfish bidding as a function of the
number of players that participate.
of users, and we believe that this is in fact an example that supports the third part of
Conjecture 2.5.
The three Bitcoin distributions behave as follows: the log of sum decreases fastest, the
square root of sum decreases in a slower fashion, and the sum decreases in the slowest
fashion. For example, when the number of players n = 2048 (which is roughly the current
Bitcoin block-size), the typical maximal discount factor is about of 0.2%, 5%, 19% for the
three distributions, respectively. When n = 217 ≈ 130, 000, the typical maximal discount
factor is about 0.0007%, 0.05%, 1%.
This shows a qualitative difference between ∆averagen and ∆
max
n when looking at some of
the distributions, mainly, for the inverse distribution and for the Bitcoin distribution with
v(x) = x. In these distributions, the average user will benefit very little from strategically
shading down her bid, but some users can benefit from strategizing. This difference between
∆averagen and ∆
max
n can in principle be the result of two different reasons. First, ∆
average
n
takes into account also the losing bidders, whose discount ratio is zero. Second, ∆maxn takes
into account only the single winning bidder with the maximal discount ratio. However, the
typical behavior (which was demonstrated in Figure 3) shows that almost all winning users
have the lowest strategic price and therefore highest discount ratio. Thus, the main reason
for the difference between ∆averagen and ∆
max
n is the first reason.
Figure 6 shows all simulation points for two distributions, the Bitcoin log of sum and the
Bitcoin sum, where the x-axis is the block size of the simulation run and the y-axis is the
maximal discount ratio of the simulation run. This figure demonstrates three main points:
First, the block sizes (number of winners) range from 1 to about 25,000 when v(x) = log x,
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Figure 5: The maximal discount ratio of a player from selfish bidding as a function of the
number of players that participate.
and from 1 to about 1,500 when v(x) = x (recall that the total number of users ranges from
23 to 217).15 Second, this difference in block sizes is the main reason why ∆maxn is smaller
in the Bitcoin log of sum distribution (larger block sizes imply smaller discount factors, as
discussed also in Section 2). Third, the distribution of simulation points is not normal, and
with outlier points. We do not have an explanation for this. The last two remarks apply to
all the distributions we sampled.
5 The RSOP Mechanism
The monopolistic-price mechanism that was previously described is miner-honest in the sense
that a myopic miner cannot increase her revenue by diverging from the suggested protocol
(for example, add false bids or delete existing bids). However, as discussed above, even
impatient users can sometimes benefit from submitting a strategic bid which is different
than their true maximum willingness to pay.
In this section we discuss an alternative approach in which we use a well-known auction
which is truthful for impatient users. That is, an impatient user will maximize her gain
by simply submitting her maximal willingness to pay. On the other hand, in this second
mechanism the challenge is to show that miners will be honest and will not manipulate
the protocol, as we further discuss below. In particular, we will show empirical evidence
15This clearly impacts the throughput of the suggested protocol: it will be about 0.1n (where n is the
number of all bidders) when v(x) = log x and about 0.01n when v(x) = x.
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Figure 6: A scatter plot of all simulation points for the Bitcoin distribution with (a) v(x) =
log x and (b) v(x) = x.
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suggesting that the profit for the miners from such manipulations becomes negligible as the
number of users increases.
More specifically, our second suggested mechanism uses the following RSOP (Random
Sampling Optimal Price) auction, defined by [GHK+06]. In the definition, the following
notation is used: For a subset A ⊆ [n] of users, and a bid vector b, let bA = (bi)i∈A. We
define pmonopolisticA (b) ≡ pmonopolistic(bA). When b is clear from the context, we simply write
pmonopolisticA .
Definition 5.1 (The RSOP auction [GHK+06]). Upon receiving n bids, b = b1, ...., bn, the
auctioneer performs the following:
1. Randomly partition the bids to two disjoint sets A and B (each bid is placed in A with
probability 1
2
, otherwise it is placed in B).
2. Compute the monopolistic price for each set: pmonopolisticA , p
monopolistic
B . The monopolistic
price of an empty set is defined to be zero.
3. The set of winning bids is A′ ∪B′, where:
A′ = {i ∈ A : bi ≥ pmonopolisticB } ; B′ = {i ∈ B : bi ≥ pmonopolisticA }.
The bidders in A′ each pay pmonopolisticB , and the bidders in B
′ pay pmonopolisticA each.
The revenue obtained in the auction is therefore
RSOP (b) = |A′| · pmonopolisticB + |B′| · pmonopolisticA .
For the RSOP mechanism, Goldberg et al.provide the following results that hold under
“the usual” auction theory assumptions, most notably that: (1) the auctioneer is honest; (2)
bidders do not collude; (3) each bidder can submit exactly one bid; (4) bidders are impatient,
i.e. they do not obtain utility from winning in future auctions (we discuss these assumptions
further below).
Theorem 5.2 ([GHK+06], Observation 6.2 and Theorem 6.4).
1. Truthfulness. The RSOP auction is truthful, i.e., a bidder maximizes her utility by
reporting her true maximal willingness to pay, even when the other bidders do not
reveal their true maximal willingness to pay.
2. Maximal Revenue. Fix any parameter h. Let b be any bid vector of n bids with
bi ∈ [1, h] for all i. Then
lim
n→∞
max
b
R(b)
RSOP (b)
= 1.
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To instantiate the RSOP-based mechanism, users must specify their maximal willingness
to pay for the transactions, and the miners are asked to create a block with all transactions
they wish to potentially include. Unlike the current Bitcoin protocol, here not all transactions
in a block are valid. After the block is mined, and propagated to the Bitcoin nodes in the
network, they determine which transactions are valid, by running Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 RSOP block verification
1: A node receives a new block B.
2: Check validity of the block and of all the included transactions according to Bitcoin’s
current rules. When referring to transactions in previous blocks, consider only valid
transactions (as explained below).
3: Compute the sets A and B using the block hash as a seed to a Cryptographically Secure
Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CSPRNG).
4: The transactions that are considered valid are the ones in A′ and B′ as in Def. 5.1.
5: Transactions in A′ pay pmonopolisticB and transactions in B
′ pay pmonopolisticA as a fee. A
fraction 1 − α of that revenue goes to the miner who mined the current block, and the
rest goes to the future miner who would mine the next valid block. Invalid transactions
do not pay anything. The parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 needs to be specified as part of the
protocol.
The algorithm has the following advantages. Since the source of the randomness (block
hash) used in line 3 is the same for all the Bitcoin nodes, all nodes will reach consensus on the
set of valid transactions. Notice that the block hash is determined by its contents including
the solution to a proof-of-work puzzle. A miner cannot easily manipulate the choice of the
sets A and B to maximize revenue16 (if she could, it could destroy the truthfulness of the
protocol). She can choose to forgo a block in which A and B were not set to her liking but
will need to generate the proof-of-work from scratch, which is extremely costly. There are
however several concerns with the proposed algorithm:
User truthfulness. The assumption that users cannot send multiple bids is unrealistic in the
Bitcoin setting. Therefore, we do not know whether the suggested protocol is truthful even
for impatient users and honest miners. Under the assumption that the user cannot control
which bids will be associated with subset A and which with subset B, we do not know how
to construct even tailored worst-case examples or if there exists an efficient algorithm to find
beneficial deviations.17
Auctioneer honesty: adding false bids. Miners are able to manipulate the protocol by adding
false bids, especially if α = 0. The purpose of choosing α > 0 is to eliminate this problem.
The following example demonstrates this issue:
16A more careful cryptographic analysis is required to establish this statement, but is outside the scope of
this work. This statement is fairly simple to show in the random oracle model.
17We discuss this type of manipulation in the other protocol, see the discussion in Sections 2.2, 3.1 and
4.
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Example 5.3. Suppose α = 0. There are two users with maximal willingness b1 = h, b2 = `
where h > 2`. With probability 1
2
both users will fall to the same set, and the revenue for
the miner would be 0. If they fall into different sets, only the h user will be included, and
will pay `. Therefore, the expected revenue is `
2
. A strategic miner can create many false
bids with a maximal willingness to pay h, by this receiving a revenue of approximately h,
which is the true bid of the high bidder. The false bids clearly cannot create a profit for the
miner but also do not harm the miner because the miner pays them to herself.
As α increases, the profitability of the strategy in the example decreases. More generally, a
dishonest auctioneer can always use the following simple strategy to increase revenue: (1)
Compute the monopolistic price over all bids; (2) Add many false bids with a fee which is
equal to the monopolistic price. Adding sufficiently many false bids will change the RSOP
revenue to that of the monopolistic price mechanism. We conjecture that this strategy is
always beneficial to the miner:
Conjecture 5.4. For every b and all choices of A and B, the RSOP revenue is at most the
monopolistic revenue. In particular, RSOP (b) ≤ R(b).
The right hand side (R(b)) is the revenue a manipulating miner can obtain with the
strategy above, and the left hand side is the RSOP revenue, for any allocation of the sets
A,B (even one chosen adversarially)
In the empirical evaluation reported below, we have never encountered a counterexample
to this conjecture. To measure the expected “gain ratio” from performing this strategy, we
define
∆RSOPn = E(v1,...,vn)∼F
[
R(v)
RSOP (v)
− 1
]
.
For distributions with bounded support sizes Theorem 5.2 proves that ∆RSOPn goes to zero
as n goes to infinity. Furthermore, Figure 7 demonstrates that this indeed happens in a
reasonably fast manner for almost all the distributions we considered in Section 4, with the
only exception being the inverse distribution. To summarize this issue:
• In the RSOP mechanism the miner can gain from adding false bids with a fee equal to
the monopolistic price. This is an easy strategy to perform, and as far as we can tell,
it never harms the miner when α = 0. If the miner does so, the mechanism changes
and becomes similar to the monopolistic-price mechanism. This, in turn, may harm
the bidder-truthfulness property.
• However, the gain ratio from performing this strategy decreases as the number of users
increases.
• Furthermore, we conjecture that, for many bid distributions and when the number
of users is fairly large, it is possible to set α > 0 in a way that will eliminate the
profitability of this strategy. Note that if α > 0, the miner needs to pay some of her
false bids to other miners.
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• On the other hand, setting α > 0, and especially high values (say, α = 0.9), introduces
risks of side-payments. A miner may provide the following service. She asks users to
submit transactions with 0 fee, and pay directly to the miner a fixed per transaction
fee. The miner will guarantee that she will eventually include these transactions in a
block which contain only other 0 fee transactions (which will then all be valid). In such
a case the miner gets all the revenue for herself, whereas if she follows the protocol she
will only receive a factor of 1 − α of the fee. If α is low, this is less likely to happen,
as this requires non-trivial coordination between the miner and the user (e.g., trust
regarding the transfer of payments, regarding inclusion in the block, etc).
Auctioneer honesty: removing true bids. The auctioneer might also be able to increase her
profit by removing true bids. The following example demonstrates this:
Example 5.5. There are n bids with value 2 and n bids with value 1. The auctioneer can
obtain a revenue of 2n w.h.p. by removing all bids of value 1. The expected revenue
for the honest miner is always at most 2n, and in the limit of large n, the revenue is
2n− 23/4
√
n√
pi
+ o(
√
n), see Appendix C Cor. C.2.
Note that the maximal revenue that can be obtained in this example by removing bids
is exactly the monopolistic revenue. We do not know if this is true in general, however we
strongly suspect that this is the case. More specifically, we conjecture:
Conjecture 5.6. For any vector of bids b, maxb′⊆bRSOP (b′) ≤ R(b).
In fact, Conjectures 5.4 and 5.6 are equivalent: by choosing b′ = b, Conjecture 5.6 implies
5.4. To show the other direction, Conjecture 5.4 implies that RSOP (b′) ≤ R(b′) and by the
monotonicity of R(·), we reach RSOP (b′) ≤ R(b′) ≤ R(b), as required.
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Note that under this conjecture, the gain ratio ∆RSOPn goes to zero for any distribution
with finite support even if the miner can remove true bids, using Theorem 5.2. Note that
this form of the conjecture is harder to verify empirically as it requires considering different
subsets for removal. But the equivalence to Conjecture 5.4, and the empirical evaluation
performed above provides some supporting evidence for it.
We do not know an efficient algorithm to find the best bids to remove, and therefore
the strategy for the miner is left open. We do not have any suggestions regarding how to
mitigate this case. Unlike the previous case (adding false bids) α is irrelevant to this strategy
by the miner. Perhaps it can be shown that removing true bids rarely beneficial, under some
distributional assumptions.
Block size. Notice that in the RSOP mechanisms blocks may contain many transactions
that do not get accepted (their bid may be below the price that is eventually determined).
One possible way to prevent this is to commit to all transactions in the Merkle tree in some
canonical order of bid size and then eventually only reveal transactions that are needed to
establish the monopolistic price and transactions that win this bid. While we do not have a
fully fleshed out scheme, we do believe that clever use of data structures and cryptographic
schemes may help in reducing the amount of wasted space in blocks in this way.
6 Discussion
In this paper we have proposed an auction based framework to redesign Bitcoin’s fee market.
Our conceptual framework proposes to use an auction in order to determine which trans-
actions are included in each block. We have proposed and analyzed two such auctions, our
primary candidate from these two is the monopolistic price auction. We have shown that it
satisfies several important properties: it is auctioneer-truthful, it maximizes the revenue of
the auctioneer under the maximal block size constraint, and, while, it is not bidder-truthful,
we have shown via theoretical analysis as well as an empirical evaluation that the incentives
of the impatient users to shade their bids decreases to zero as the number of transactions
increase. By redesigning Bitcoin’s fee market in this way, we propose a way to decouple the
issue of miners’ revenues from the block-size debate.
One restriction of our analysis is our assumption of impatient users, which care only
about the next block. We believe that it is important to tackle this restriction in future
work, either theoretically or empirically. For example, it will be interesting to analyze, via
simulations, the possible gain for patient users, and the way that the distribution of bids
changes if rejected bids stay in the system and continue to participate in subsequent blocks.
Different types of off-chain transaction channels are currently under development (see,
e.g. [PD15, DW15]) and might radically change the transaction fee market. Several aspects
of the demand for blockchain transactions would be affected: the level of patience of users
for transactions that set up payment channels, the willingness to pay fees, and the basic
demand for transacting on-chain may differ from the pre-lightning fee market. An interesting
direction for future work is hence to explore the interaction of auction based mechanisms for
on-chain transactions with off-chain channels.
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As was mentioned, computational power invested in computing buys security for the
network. But, how much security should be achieved? Perhaps the network spends too
much on its security.
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A Properties of phonest, pstrategic, and δ
Recall that num(v, z) ≡ |{vi|vi ≥ z}|.
Claim A.1. If pmonopolistic(v−i) ≤ vi, then pmonopolistic(v−i) ≤ pmonopolistic(v). Furthermore,
if pmonopolistic(v−i) = vi, then pmonopolistic(v−i) = pmonopolistic(v).
Proof Let x = pmonopolistic(v−i) and y = pmonopolistic(v). Assume by contradiction that
x > y. By definition of the monopolistic price for v−i, x · num(v−i, x) > y · num(v−i, y).
Since vi ≥ x > y, num(v, x) = num(v−i, x) + 1 and num(v, y) = num(v−i, y) + 1. Thus,
x · num(v, x) > y · num(v, y)− y + x > y · num(v, y), contradicting y = pmonopolistic(v).
Claim A.2. For any v and any i, pstrategic(v−i) < pmonopolistic(v−i).
Proof Let k∗ = k∗(v−i), and b∗ = k
∗
k∗+1p
monopolistic(v−i). Suppose by contradiction that
pmonopolistic(b∗,v−i) > b∗. This would imply that pmonopolistic(b∗,v−i) = pmonopolistic(v−i). But
this is a contradiction since num((b∗, v−i), b∗) · b∗ ≥ (k∗+ 1) · b∗ = k∗ · pmonopolistic(v−i). Thus,
pmonopolistic(b∗,v−i) ≤ b∗. Since pstrategic(v−i) = minb pmonopolistic(b,v−i) ≤ pmonopolistic(b∗,v−i),
the claim follows.
Corollary A.3. Fix v1, ..., vn and let i
∗ = argmaxi=1,...,nvi. Then,
pstrategic(v−i∗) < pmonopolistic(v−i∗) ≤ pmonopolistic(v).
This is an immediate consequence of Claims A.2 and A.1.
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Claim A.4. For any v and any i, let x = pmonopolistic(v). Then, pmonopolistic(x,v−i) ≤ x
Proof Suppose towards a contradiction that y = pmonopolistic(x,v−i) > x. There-
fore y · num((x,v−i), y) > x · num((x,v−i), x). Note that num(v, y) ≥ num((x,v−i), y)
and num(v, x) ≤ num((x,v−i), x). This implies y · num(v, y) ≥ y · num((x,v−i), y) >
x · num((x,v−i), x) ≥ x · num(v, x). Therefore y · num(v, y) > x · num(v, x) which con-
tradicts the fact that x = pmonopolistic(v).
Claim A.5. For any v and any i, pmonopolistic(pstrategic(v−i),v−i) = pstrategic(v−i).
Proof Recall the definition, pstrategic(v−i) ≡ min{b | pmonopolistic(b,v−i) ≤ b}. It imme-
diately follows that pmonopolistic(pstrategic(v−i),v−i) ≤ pstrategic(v−i). Assume towards a con-
tradiction that the inequality is strict, and let x = pmonopolistic(pstrategic(v−i),v−i). But then
Claim A.4 implies that pmonopolistic(x,v−i) ≤ x, which is a contradiction since pstrategic(v−i)
is supposed to be the minimal such x.
Claim A.6. Fix any v, let i∗ = argmaxi=1,...,nvi, k
∗ = k∗(v−i∗), x = phonest(v) and let y
be the smallest element in the support of F which is at least pstrategic(v−i∗). Then, x = y
implies that pstrategic(v−i∗) ≥ k∗k∗+1 · phonest(v).
Proof By Corollary A.3,
pstrategic(v−i∗) < pmonopolistic(v−i∗) ≤ pmonopolistic(vi∗ ,v−i∗) = phonest(v). (A.1)
I.e., y ≤ pmonopolistic(v−i∗) ≤ x (because pmonopolistic(v−i∗) is in the support of F ). Thus, since
x = y,
pmonopolistic(v−i∗) = x = phonest(v). (A.2)
By definition of k∗, there exist k∗ values in v−i∗ that are at least pmonopolistic(v−i∗). Overall,
num(v−i∗ , pstrategic(v−i∗)) = num(v−i∗ , y) = num(v−i∗ , x) = k∗. (A.3)
Therefore, R(pstrategic(v−i∗),v−i∗) = (k∗ + 1)pstrategic(v−i∗): this follows from Claim A.5,
and Eq. (A.3). Thus, for any number z > pstrategic(v−i∗), (k∗ + 1)pstrategic(v−i∗) ≥ z ·
num(v−i∗ , z) (since z > pstrategic(v−i∗), the number of bids in (pstrategic(v∗−i), v−i∗) that are
at least z is exactly num(v−i∗ , z)).
Taking z = phonest(v) (which satisfies z > pstrategic(v−i∗) by Eq.(A.1)), num(v−i∗ , phonest(v)) =
k∗ (where here we used Eq. (A.2)). It follows that x = y implies that (k∗+1)pstrategic(v−i∗) ≥
k∗ · phonest(v), and the claim follows.
Claim A.7. For any v = (v1, ..., vn), and any v
′
i such that vi ≥ v′i ≥ pmonopolistic(v),
pmonopolistic(v) ≥ pmonopolistic(v′i,v−i).
We remark that pmonopolistic(v) is not necessarily monotonically increasing as a function
of vi, for example, p
monopolistic(2, 0) = 2 > 1 = pmonopolistic(2, 1). Hence, the importance of
the condition v′i ≥ pmonopolistic(v).
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Proof Denote x = pmonopolistic(v) and y = pmonopolistic(v′i,v−i). Assume towards a
contradiction that x < y. Therefore
y · num(v, y) ≥ y · num((v′i,v−i), y) > x · num((v′i,v−i), x) = x · num(v, x)
where the first step follows since vi ≥ v′i, the second step follows since y is the monopolistic
price for (v′i,v−i) (the inequality is strict because y > x), and the third step follows since
vi ≥ v′i ≥ x. However y · num(v, y) > x · num(v, x) contradicts the fact that x is the
monopolistic price for v.
Claim A.8. For any v1, ..., vn and i, j, vi > vj ≥ pstrategic(v−j) implies that pstrategic(v−j) ≥
pstrategic(v−i).
We remark that the condition vj ≥ pstrategic(v−j) is important as without it the claim is
not true. For example, take v = (2, 1, 0):
psrategic(v−2) = psrategic(2, 0) = 1 >
2
3
= pstrategic(2, 1) = pstrategic(v−3).
Proof Let b = pstrategic(v−j). We will prove that b ≥ pmonopolistic(b, v−i), which implies
the claim since pstrategic(v−i) ≡ min{b | b ≥ pmonopolistic(b, v−i)}.
By applying Claim A.7 with respect to u = (v1, . . . , vj−1, b, vj+1, . . . , vn) and u′ =
(v1, . . . , vi−1, vj, vi+1, . . . , vj−1, b, vj+1, . . . , vn) implies that pmonopolistic(u) ≥ pmonopolistic(u′)
(note that vi ≥ vj ≥ b ≥ pmonopolistic(b,v−j) where the last inequality follows from the
definition of pstrategic()v−j); therefore ui ≥ u′i ≥ pmonopolistic(u)). Thus
b ≥ pmonopolistic(u) ≥ pmonopolistic(u′) = pmonopolistic(b, v−i)
and the claim follows.
Claim A.9. For any v1, ..., vn and i, j, vi ≥ vj implies δi(vi,v−i) ≥ δj(vj,v−j).
Proof If vj < p
strategic(v−j), δj(vj,v−j) = 0 and the claim follows. Thus assume
vj ≥ pstrategic(v−j), and we have vi > vj ≥ pstrategic(v−j) ≥ pstrategici (v−i) where the last in-
equality follows from Claim A.8. Since phonest is the same in both terms, and pstrategic(v−j) ≥
pstrategic(v−i), we have δi(vi, v−i) ≥ δj(vj, v−j).
Claim A.10. For any b−i and u ∈ N+, define18
pmultibidu (b−i) = min{u · bi | bi ∈ R, bi ≥ pmonopolistic(
u times︷ ︸︸ ︷
bi, . . . , bi, b−i)}.
Then, for any u ≥ n+ 1, pmultibidu (b−i) > pmultibid1 (b−i).
18The minimum is well defined – see the argument next to Eq. (2.6).
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Proof Let b = p
multibid
u (b−i)
u
. Then, b · (u + num(b−i, b) ≥ k∗(b−i) · pmonopolistic(b−i).
Therefore,
pmultibidu (b−i) = b · u ≥
k∗(b−i) · pmonopolistic(b−i)
u+ num(b−i, b)
· u (A.4)
If k∗(b−i) ≥ 2 then uu+num(b−i,b) ·k∗(b−i) > 1 since u > n > num(b−i, b). Therefore Eq. (A.4)
implies that pmultibidu (b−i) > p
monopolistic(b−i) > pstrategic(b−i) = pmultibid1 (b−i), implying the
claim.
If k∗(b−i) = 1 then uu+num(b−i,b) ·k∗(b−i) > 12 . Therefore Eq. (A.4) implies that pmultibidu (b−i) >
pmonopolistic(b−i)
2
≥ pstrategic(b−i) = pmultibid1 (b−i), implying the claim. (Here, in the second in-
equality we used the fact that k∗(b−i) = 1, and bidding half of the highest bid will win in
this case.)
Claim A.11. Fix any b−i and let b, u be the arguments which minimize Eq. (2.6). Then,
b = pmonopolistic(
u times︷ ︸︸ ︷
b, . . . , b, b−i).
Proof By definition b ≥ pmonopolistic(
u times︷ ︸︸ ︷
b, . . . , b, b−i). Suppose towards a contradiction
that the inequality is strict, and take some b′ such that
b > b′ ≥ pmonopolistic(
u times︷ ︸︸ ︷
b, . . . , b, b−i).
Claim A.7 implies that
b′ ≥ pmonopolistic(
u times︷ ︸︸ ︷
b′, . . . , b′, b−i),
contradicting the minimality of (b, u) since b · u > b′ · u.
Claim A.12. Fix any b−i and let (b, u) be the arguments which minimize Eq. (2.6). Then,
b ≤ pmonopolistic(b−i).
Proof Let b′ = pmonopolistic(b−i). Then, the second part of Claim A.1 implies that
b′ = pmonopolistic(b′, b−i). Thus (b′, u′ = 1) satisfies the requirement of Eq. (2.6). Hence
b · u ≤ b′ and the claim follows.
Claim A.13. Fix any b−i and any bi < pmonopolistic(bi, b−i). Then there exists δ > 0 such
that for any 0 <  < δ, pmonopolistic(bi + , b−i) = pmonopolistic(b, b−i).
Proof Let v = (bi, b−i) and assume w.l.o.g. that v is ordered, i.e., v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn.
Let k be such that vk = p
monopolistic(v). Let j be the minimal index of bid bi in v, i.e.,
vj−1 > vj = bi. Note that j > k since vj < vk by assumption. Also note that vj · j < vk · k
since the monopolistic price is vk. Choose δ > 0 such that vj+δ < vj−1 and (vj+δ)·j < vk ·k.
By definition, for any 0 <  < δ, pmonopolistic(vj + ),v−j) = pmonopolistic(v), and the claim
follows.
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B A few mathematical facts
Claim B.1. Let f : <≥0 → <≥0 be any function that satisfies the following property:
If x < f(x) there exists δ > 0 such that for any 0 <  < δ, f(x + ) = f(x). Let
A = {x ∈ <≥0 | x ≥ f(x)}. Then, if A is not empty, inf A ∈ A.
Proof Note that if A is not empty than the infimum of A is well defined since A is
bounded from below by 0. Let x∗ = inf A. Assume towards a contradiction that x∗ /∈ A,
i.e., x∗ < f(x∗). Thus, by the property of f , there exists  > 0 such that x∗ +  < f(x∗) and
f(x) = f(x∗) for every x∗ < x < x∗+ . Since x∗ = inf A there exists x ∈ A, x∗ < x < x∗+ .
For this x, f(x) ≤ x < x∗ +  < f(x∗) = f(x), a contradiction.
Claim B.2. Let X ∼ B(n, p) be a binomial random variable. For every i, Pr(X = i) =
O
(
1√
n
)
.
Proof If np is an integer, the mode (most likely value of the distribution) is its mean
np.19 The case where np is not an integer can be handled is a similar manner. Therefore,
our goal is to show that Pr(X = np) = O
(
1√
n
)
. By using Stirling’s approximation,
Pr(X = np) =
(
n
np
)
pnp(1− p)n(1−p)
≈ 1√
2pinp(1− p) = O
(
1√
n
)
.
Of course, this is only valid when p is treated as a constant.
Claim B.3. Let (X1, X2, X3) ∼ Trinomial(n, p1, p2, p3) be a triple of trinomial random
variables where p1, p2 > 0. For every function f , Pr(X1 = f(X1 +X2)) = O
(
1√
n
)
.
Proof
Pr(X1 = f(X1 +X2)) =
n∑
z=0
Pr(X1 = f(X1 +X2)|X3 = z) Pr(X3 = z)
=
n∑
z=0
Pr(X1 = f(n− z)|X3 = z) Pr(X3 = z)
Using Chernoff bound, and p3 < 1 (since p1, p2 > 0 and p1 + p2 + p3 = 1), for α =
p3+1
2
< 1,
Pr(X3 ≥ αn) = O( 1√n). Conditioned that X3 = z, X1 has a Binomial distribution: X1 ∼
B(n − z, p1
1−p3 ) (here we use the condition p1, p2 > 0 to conclude that 0 <
p1
1−p3 < 1). By
19This can be shown directly by computing Pr(X=i)Pr(X=i+1) .
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Claim B.2,
Pr(X1 = f(X1 +X2)) =
n∑
z=0
Pr(X1 = f(X1 +X2)|X3 = z) Pr(X3 = z)
≤
bαnc∑
z=0
Pr(X1 = f(n− z)|X3 = z) Pr(X3 = z) +O
(
1√
n
)
≤
bαnc∑
z=0
O
(
1√
n− z
)
Pr(X3 = z) +O
(
1√
n
)
≤
bαnc∑
z=0
O
(
1√
(1− α)n
)
Pr(X3 = z) +O
(
1√
n
)
= O
(
1√
n
)
C Analysis of Example 5.5
Claim C.1.
lim
n→∞
RSOP (
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
2, . . . , 2,
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1)− 2n√
n
= −2
3/4
√
pi
(C.1)
Proof Let Xi be the indicator variable whether the i’th 2-bidder is in group A, and
similarly Yi for the i’th 1-bidder. Let Zi = Xi − Yi. Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi, Y =
∑n
i=1 Yi and
Z =
∑n
i=1 Zi.
Note that the revenue for any realization of the coin toss is exactly 2n−|Z|. Suppose first
that Z ≥ 0, i.e., X ≥ Y . In this case, the monopolistic price in A is 1 and the monopolistic
price in B is 2. Thus, the revenue is 1 · (X + Y ) + 2 · (n−X) = 2n−Z. Similarly, if Z < 0,
the revenue is 2n+ Z. This shows that in all cases, the revenue is 2n− |Z|.
Since E[Zi] = 0 and Var(Zi) = 12 , by the central limit theorem,
1√
n
Z converges in dis-
tribution to N(0, σ2 = 1
2
) as n goes to infinity. Using the properties of the half-normal
distribution, the expected value of |Z|√
n
is 2
√
σ√
pi
= 2
3/4√
pi
. This completes the proof, since
RSOP (
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
2, . . . , 2,
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1) = 2n− E[|Z|].
Corollary C.2. RSOP (
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
2, . . . , 2,
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1) = 2n− 23/4√
pi
√
n+ o(
√
n).
34
